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WHERE LAW MEETS EQUITY: EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS UNDER CALIFORNIA BUSINESS
AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 7031
Eric R. Reed*
California’s contractor licensing statutes severely penalize
unlicensed contractors. Even a brief license disruption may result in a
contractor being unable to collect unpaid invoices or having to disgorge
money received for past work. Courts began developing a “substantial
compliance” exception to these statutes shortly after the legislature
enacted them. This institutional tug-of-war prompted the legislature to
codify the exception in section 7031(e) of the California Business and
Professions Code, and, later, to create a unique stand-alone procedure
for adjudicating substantial compliance. Section 7031(e) refers to this
procedure as an “evidentiary hearing” but gives little guidance about
how to conduct such a hearing.
This Article first explores the evidentiary hearing’s equitable
roots in the judicial substantial compliance doctrine. Next, it discusses
how counsel and judicial officers can use substantial compliance
hearings to confront and resolve disputes involving contractors with
licensing problems. Lastly, the Article concludes by proposing minor
revisions to section 7031(e) that will clarify existing ambiguities, and,
ideally, ensure the long-term viability of the statute and the unique
procedure it created.

* Staff Attorney, California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The author wishes
to thank Beth Behnam, Sebastian Nelson, and Lisa Prince of the California State Archives for
critical legislative research. The views stated in this Article are the author’s alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California law provides few protections for those who perform
construction services without a license. A contractor experiencing the
briefest license disruption may find him or herself unable to collect
unpaid invoices or forced to disgorge money received for past work.
Appellate courts spent much of the twentieth century developing a
“substantial compliance” exception to protect contractors whose
technical transgressions or excusable neglect did not warrant their
harsh punishments under California law. The judiciary’s institutional
tug-of-war with regulators prompted the legislature to codify the
courts’ equitable concerns and to create a procedural tool to address
these concerns without compromising the state’s regulatory aims. This
procedural tool—an “evidentiary hearing” guaranteed by Business
and Professions Code section 7031(e)1—is akin to a pleading
challenge or dispositive motion. Little guidance is found in case law,
court rules, regulations, or even section 7031 itself about how to
conduct such a hearing.
This Article first explores the evidentiary hearing’s equitable
roots in the judicial substantial compliance doctrine. Next, it discusses
how counsel and judicial officers can use subdivision (e) hearings to
confront and resolve disputes involving contractors with licensing
problems. The Article concludes by proposing minor revisions to
section 7031 that will clarify existing ambiguities, and, ideally, ensure
the long-term viability of the statute and the unique procedure it
created.
II. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 7031 AND THE
JUDICIAL SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE
Section 7031 of California’s Business and Professions Code
serves as a “shield and sword” for consumers litigating with their
contractors.2 The shield, subdivision (a), deprives the unlicensed
contractor of standing to seek compensation for services requiring a
license.3 This applies even if the consumer knows the contractor is not
1. The author refers to the California Code unless noted otherwise.
2. See White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 443 (Ct. App. 2009) (“In 2001, the
Legislature complemented the shield created by subdivision (a) of section 7031 by adding a sword
that allows persons who utilize unlicensed contractors to recover compensation paid to the
contractor for performing unlicensed work.”).
3. Subdivision (a) states as follows at the time of writing:
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licensed and encourages performance nonetheless. 4 The sword,
subdivision (b), allows the consumer to sue for disgorgement of all
amounts paid under the contract.5 This includes both labor and
materials.6 The legislature considers the “harsh and unfair results” to
contractors outweighed by “the important public policy of deterring
licensing violations and ensuring that all contractors are licensed.”7
A. The Origins of Business and Professions Code Section 7031
The current section 7031 began its life in 1929 as part of the
original California State License Law (CSLL).8 The CSLL created the
Contractors License Bureau, the predecessor of today’s Contractors
State License Board (the “Board”), and contained the basic statutory
framework the fledgling agency would use to better regulate the state’s
quickly expanding rolls of professional builders. Section 12 of the
CSLL contained much of subdivision (a)’s current “shield” language
and criminalized acting in the capacity of a contractor without

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), no person engaged in the business or
acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover
in law or equity in any action, in any court of this state for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is required
by this chapter without alleging that he or she was a duly licensed contractor at all
times during the performance of that act or contract regardless of the merits of the
cause of action brought by the person, except that this prohibition shall not apply
to contractors who are each individually licensed under this chapter but who fail to
comply with Section 7029.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(a) (Deering 2020).
4. See Hydrotech Sys., Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1991) (holding that an
out-of-state subcontractor was barred from recovering unpaid invoices despite the client and
general contractor promising to pay subcontractor regardless of licensing status).
5. Subdivision (b) states as follows at the time of writing: “Except as provided in subdivision
(e), a person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor
for performance of any act or contract.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(b).
6. See Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 289–90 (Ct. App.
2010) (citing White, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 444–45).
7. Id. at 290; see also MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.,
115 P.3d 41, 46–47 (Cal. 2005) (“Section 7031 represents a legislative determination that the
importance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs
any harshness between the parties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by denying
violators the right to maintain any action for compensation in the courts of this state.” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Hydrotech, 803 P.2d at 374)).
8. See Act of Aug. 14, 1929, ch. 791, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1591, 1591–92 (“An act providing for
the registration of contractors, and defining the term contractor; providing the method of obtaining
licenses to engage in the business of contracting, and fixing the fees for such licenses; providing
the method of suspension and cancellation of such licenses; and prescribing the punishment for
violation of the provisions of this act.”).
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registering with the newly-established Bureau. 9 Depriving unlicensed
contractors of standing to enforce outstanding debts for their services
was not a novel remedial concept, but rather, a repurposing of the
common law tenet that a contract is void ab initio if created in violation
of law.10 Pre-CSLL authorities usually upheld licensing requirements
in professions such as contracting and architecture so long as the
regulating entity intended them to protect the public interest, and not
simply generate revenue.11
B. Courts Develop the “Substantial Compliance Doctrine” to
Preserve the Standing of Unlicensed Contractors That Satisfy
Certain Criteria
It did not take long for consumers to appreciate the CSLL’s
tactical potential. Anyone sued by one’s contractor for unpaid bills
could gain tremendous leverage—or dispose of the case entirely—by
showing the contractor ran afoul of the CSLL, and thus lacked
standing under section 12.12 Courts frequently found it difficult to
stand aside while defendants used technical licensing transgressions
to avoid paying legitimate debts for competently performed
construction services. A doctrine of substantial compliance took shape
within a decade. The doctrine’s progenitor is recognized case Citizens
State Bank v. Gentry,13 a 1937 intermediate appellate opinion arising
out of the reconstruction of a theater property damaged during the
1933 Long Beach earthquake.14
9. See Holm v. Bramwell, 67 P.2d 114, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937) (“‘Any person who acts in
the capacity of a contractor [or subcontractor] within the meaning of this act without a license as
herein provided, . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor,’ and shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment
as described therein.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Act of Aug. 14, 1929 § 12)).
10. See id. (“It has been repeatedly held that a party to an illegal contract may not rest his
cause or recover judgment based upon such void agreement.”).
11. See Renee A. Mangini, Comment, The Contractors’ State License Law: From Strict
Adherence to Substantial Compliance, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 618 (1987) (“The courts have
further established the rule that when a licensing statute is enacted for the protection of the public,
a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute is void. In applying this rule to
the [CSLL] . . . the effect is that any contract with an unlicensed contractor is void at the outset.”
(citing Wood v. Krepps, 143 P. 691, 692–93 (Cal. 1914))); Payne v. De Vaughn, 246 P. 1069, 1071
(Cal. Ct. App. 1926) (citing Levinson v. Boas, 88 P. 825, 828 (Cal. 1907) (denying an architect’s
claim for professional fees because he lacked license)).
12. See Holm, 67 P.2d at 115 (contractor sued owner who refused to pay for masonry work;
court denied contractor’s claim because masonry subcontractor, while licensed at time of
performance, did not hold license when he signed the subcontract).
13. 67 P.2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937).
14. Id. at 365. See generally Lawrence Jennings Imel, Comment, Substantial Compliance with
the Contractors’ State License Law: An Equitable Doctrine Producing Inequitable Results, 34 LOY.
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The contractor in Gentry held a license under his own name when
first hired by the owner.15 He renewed his license mid-project and
requested the bureau re-issue it in the name of his newly formed
corporation.16 Later, the contractor sued the owner for unpaid bills.17
The owner accused him of performing construction services without a
license and moved for nonsuit because the contractor no longer held
the license in place when he began working.18 The trial court denied
nonsuit.19 The court of appeal affirmed the ruling on equitable
grounds:
In our opinion, where a manifestly unjust and inequitable
result would follow a holding that plaintiff contractor was
without capacity to sue on his contract, the individual
plaintiff in whose name the license stood at the time the
contract was made and the corporate entity organized by him
in whose name the license stood at the time the cause of
action accrued, should be considered as one.20
The California Supreme Court encountered a similar situation
nine years later in Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc.21 Gatti signed
a residential building contract with defendant and hired Moore as the
project’s foreman.22 Gatti and Moore decided for a mid-project to
operate as a partnership.23 Defendant consented to the arrangement but
later refused to pay because Gatti and Moore, while individually
licensed, violated the CSLL by not obtaining a separate partnership
license.24 The trial court entered judgment for the two contractors
despite this violation.25 The supreme court affirmed. Citing Gentry, it
described Gatti and Moore as having “substantially complied” with
the CSLL by maintaining their individual licenses during the project:

L.A. L. REV. 1539, 1543–55 (2001) (surveying the doctrine’s development over its first six
decades).
15. Gentry, 67 P.2d at 365.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 366–67.
21. 166 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1946).
22. Id. at 265.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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If defendant is allowed to defeat plaintiffs’ legitimate claim
on this technical ground, resting on an unnecessarily strict
construction of the statutory provision for the additional joint
contractor’s license and denying any effect to the
combination license in fact issued to plaintiffs and a third
person as above recited, the legislative scheme in relation to
the licensing of contractors, intended “for the safety and
protection of the public,” would become an unwarranted
shield for the avoidance of a just obligation.26
Lone dissenter Justice Douglas L. Edmonds characterized the
decision as “directly contrary to the plain and positive language” of
the CSLL.27 The majority encroached on the legislature’s authority to
regulate the contracting business, he reasoned, by creating an ad hoc
exemption to a comprehensive statutory framework:
There can be no substantial compliance with such a statute.
Wisely or unwisely, the Legislature has specified that two
persons individually licensed may not, as partners, engage in
the contracting business without having obtained a license in
the name of the partnership. Unquestionably, that
requirement is within the scope of legislative action, and,
therefore, beyond the reach of judicial consideration.28
Courts spent the next two decades exploring the doctrine’s
boundaries.29 An elemental approach emerged in 1966’s Latipac, Inc.
v. Superior Court. 30 Justice Tobriner’s majority opinion created a
three-part test to determine which contractor-plaintiffs could invoke
its protections:
(1) “that plaintiff held a valid license at the time of
contracting”;
(2) “that plaintiff readily secured a renewal of that license”;
and

26. Id. at 266.
27. Id. at 267 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
28. Id. (citing Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 75 P.2d 599, 603–04 (Cal. 1938)).
29. See, e.g., Loving & Evans v. Blick, 204 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1949); Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball
Sons, 308 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1957); Weiman v. Superior Ct., 336 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1959); Bierman v.
Hagstrom Constr. Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Ct. App. 1959); Precision Fabricators, Inc. v. Levant, 6
Cal. Rptr. 395 (Ct. App. 1960).
30. 411 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1966).
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(3) “that the responsibility and competence of plaintiff’s
managing officer were officially confirmed throughout the
period of performance of the contract.”31
The court’s most recent appointee, Justice Stanley Mosk, penned
a dissent joined by Chief Justice Traynor and Justice McComb. He
described substantial compliance as a “dangerous doctrine” and
quickly picked up where now-retired Justice Edmonds left off two
decades earlier.32 Justice Mosk considered the latest iteration of the
doctrine a foray into legislative territory that simply ignored those
statutes it found troublesome.33 The majority dismissed the idea that
its decision created or perpetuated institutional tension: “For nearly
three decades we have developed and applied to cases arising under
section 7031 the doctrine of ‘substantial compliance’; during that
entire period the Legislature has indicated no hint of disapproval of
this construction.”34
Latipac left open whether contractors must satisfy all three factors
to establish substantial compliance.35 Subsequent lower court
decisions suggested they did.36 The high court next visited the doctrine
in 1985. Asdourian v. Araj37 described the Latipac factors as
“considerations which might warrant application of the doctrine.”38
Chief Justice Bird’s majority opinion described the judiciary’s core
inquiry as deciding whether a contractor’s conduct satisfied the core
policy of the CSLL, i.e., “to protect the public from the perils incident

31. Id. at 567.
32. Id. at 576.
33. See id. at 577 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“Although one may well be sympathetic to the
equitable arguments of the contractor, such arguments should be addressed to the Legislature rather
than the court; the Contractors License Law . . . is a comprehensive regulatory statute the wisdom
of which is not subject to our review.”). At least one contemporary commentator characterized
Latipac as expanding rather than reciting the doctrine. See Paul E. Principe, Case Note, Substantial
Compliance with Contractors Licensing Statutes: Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court (Cal. 1966), 7
SANTA CLARA LAW. 157, 163 (1966) (“The majority . . . have relied on precedent and have
somewhat ignored questions of legislative intent in sections 7031 and 7068.1. Those sections
appear to require strict compliance but the courts have not so interpreted them.”).
34. Latipac, 411 P.2d at 567 (majority opinion).
35. See id. (“Since all these elements here concur, we need not determine whether any of them,
singly or in more limited combination, would constitute ‘substantial compliance.’”).
36. See, e.g., Brown v. Solano Cnty. Bus. Dev., Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Ct. App. 1979);
Weeks v. Merritt Bldg. & Constr. Co., 114 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Ct. App. 1974); Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior
Ct., 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct. App. 1972), abrogated by Asdourian v. Araj, 696 P.2d 95, 100 (Cal.
1985); Frank v. Kozlovsky, 91 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1970).
37. 696 P.2d 95 (Cal. 1985).
38. Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
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to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.”39 Like
the court in Latipac, the majority highlighted the legislature’s silence
as tacit acceptance of common law safeguards for “innocent”
contractors whose technical CSLL violations prevent them from
collecting valid debts: “It has now been almost five decades since the
doctrine was first applied. The Legislature has manifested no
disapproval. In the limited and extraordinary circumstances in which
it is applied, the policies underlying the doctrine remain
compelling.”40
Asdourian tied up Latipac’s loose ends by holding that a
contractor need not satisfy all three factors if the facts of the case
“clearly indicate substantial compliance which satisfies the policy of
the Contractors License Law.”41 Justice Mosk, the only remaining
justice of the Latipac era, penned his second dissent on the subject.
“To achieve what they perceive as a desirable result,” he wrote, “the
majority employ equity in a simple contract action and in doing so
they emasculate a legislative enactment that is clear and
unambiguous.”42
C. The Legislature Abolishes Judicial Substantial Compliance
Asdourian and its immediate progeny represented the high-water
mark of judicial substantial compliance.43 The legislature responded
to the high court’s equitable muscle-flexing by passing Assembly Bill
841, a Board-sponsored bill introduced during the 1989–1990 session.
The bill abolished the doctrine by appending twelve words to the end
of section 7031 as subdivision (d): “The judicial doctrine of substantial
compliance shall not apply to this section.”44
In effect, the legislature wiped fifty years of case law off the
books as of January 1, 1990. This rebuke of judicial encroachment, as
exemplified by Asdourian, served “as a warning to the courts that
public policy behind [section 7031] was strong, despite its harsh

39. Id. at 103 (quoting Davis Co. v. Superior Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454 (Ct. App. 1969)).
40. Id. at 102.
41. Id. at 100.
42. Id. at 107 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
43. See Knapp Dev. & Design v. Pal-Mal Props., Ltd., 219 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Asdourian, 696 P.2d at 101 (finding the presence of just one Latipac factor enough to
establish substantial compliance)).
44. Act of Sept. 12, 1989, ch. 368, § 1, 1989 Cal. Stat. 1509, 1509 (current version at CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (Deering 2020)).
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impact upon the unlicensed person who had performed work in good
faith.”45 The amended statute also required contractors to establish
their licensure immediately upon filing a collection action by
“produc[ing] a verified certificate of licensure” from the Board or else
face certain dismissal.46
D. The Legislature “Conditionally Resurrects” the Doctrine and
Introduces the Evidentiary Hearing
Contractors with brief mid-project suspensions or other minor
licensing issues found themselves without standing to initiate
collection actions unless the underlying contract predated the 1990
amendment.47 The industry reacted quickly. A year later the Southern
California Contractor’s Association sponsored legislation “to ‘ensure
that a contractor’s ability to operate as a licensed contractor is not
jeopardized because of a technical error or oversight by the
contractor.’”48 Assembly Bill 1382 sought to amend section 7031 to
include a “special exemption” for contractors who could demonstrate
substantial compliance with the CSLL.49 The Board initially opposed
the bill out of concern it would “make life easier” for unlicensed
contractors but later withdrew its opposition.50 It passed unanimously
in both the Assembly and Senate.51 The following became subsection
(d) of the newly amended section 7031:
The judicial doctrine of substantial compliance shall not
apply to this section, except that a court may determine that
there has been substantial compliance with licensure
requirements, for purposes of this section, if it is shown at
an evidentiary hearing that the person was a duly licensed
45. Edmund L. Regalia, Is the Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Licensing of Contractors
Still Alive and Well?, 14 MILLER & STARR, REAL EST. NEWSALERT, May 2004, no. 5 , at 1, 2.
46. Act of Sept. 12, 1989, § 1.
47. See G.E. Hetrick & Assoc., Inc. v. Summit Constr. & Maint. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803,
809 (Ct. App. 1992) (“In the case at bar, Hetrick, Inc. is entitled to rely on the statutorily
disapproved doctrine of substantial compliance with the Contractors License Law, under the
authority of Hydrotech. The contract and performance at issue in this suit precede the 1989
amendments to section 7031, which are not to be applied retroactively.”).
48. Constr. Fin., LLC v. Perlite Plastering Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 581 (Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting S. COMM. ON BUS., PROF. & ECON. DEV., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1382, 1991–1992 Reg.
Sess., at 2 (Cal. 1991) (amended May 15, 1991)).
49. S. COMM. ON BUS., PROF. & ECON. DEV., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1382, at 2.
50. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFS., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1382, 1991–1992 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal.
1991).
51. See id. at 1.
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contractor during any portion of the 90 days immediately
preceding the performance of the act or contract for which
compensation is sought, that the persons’ category of
licensure would have authorized the performance of that act
or contract, and that noncompliance with the licensure
requirement was the result of (1) inadvertent clerical error, or
(2) other error or delay not caused by the negligence of the
person.52
With statutory substantial compliance in place, the legislature
turned its attention to another problem created by the 1990
amendment. The glut of certificate requests received by the Board in
the wake of the amendment caused a six-month backlog at the
agency.53 Many licensed contractors began losing their cases only
because they could not produce a certificate in time.54 The Board
sponsored an amendment to section 7031 during the 1992–1993
session requiring contractors to produce a certificate only when the
opposing party controverted the contractor’s license status.55 The
Board sponsored yet another amendment during the 1993–1994
session to clarify that “contractors still had the burden of proving
licensure and there was no need for persons they were suing for
compensation to produce the verified certificate.”56
E. Disgorgement: Consumers Get a Sword
The flurry of amendments in the 1990s did not change section
7031’s defensive character. It remained focused on the contractor, or
rather, on depriving unlicensed contractors a forum in which to
enforce their legal rights. The statute served as a shield to ward off
collection lawsuits but stopped short of providing a remedy to
aggrieved consumers. These consumers still needed to pursue out-ofpocket losses against an unlicensed contractor in the same manner as
they would against a licensed contractor, i.e., by prevailing in a
conventional breach of contract or construction defect action.
52. Act of Oct. 8, 1991, ch. 632, § 1, 1991 Cal. Stat. 2936, 2937 (emphasis added).
53. See Womack v. Lovell, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 479 (Ct. App. 2015).
54. See id.; see also Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 437 (Ct. App.
1997) (quoting ASSEMB. COMM. ON CONSUMER PROT., GOV’T EFFICIENCY AND ECON. DEV.,
ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 2413, 1991–1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992)).
55. See Act of July 16, 1992, ch. 229, § 1, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1019, 1019.
56. Womack, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 (emphasis omitted) (citing Act of Oct. 4, 1993, ch. 797,
§ 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. 4357, 4358).
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This changed when the legislature passed Assembly Bill 678,
which “add[ed] a sword remedy to the hiring party’s litigation
arsenal.”57 The bill added the following subdivision to section 7031
effective January 1, 2002: “A person who utilizes the services of an
unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the
unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.”58
The bill’s final floor analysis cited a recent Court of Appeal
opinion as highlighting the need for a built-in consumer remedy to
round out the statute’s defensive provisions:
According to the sponsor, this bill is intended to address the
recent case of Cooper v. Westbrook Torrey Hills, LP (2000)
81 Cal. App. 4th 1294, in which the court . . . referred to the
Business and Professions Code, Section 7031(a) prohibiting
an unlicensed contractor from recovering fees, but not
requiring any refund of compensation already paid to the
contractor. Cooper relied on Culbertson v. Cizek (1964) 225
Cal. App. 2d 451, 473, in which the court permitted the
unlicensed contractor to offset “as a defense against sums
due the plaintiffs any amounts that would otherwise be due
Cizek under his contract.” This bill is intended to clearly state
that those using the services of unlicensed contractors are
entitled to bring an action for recovery of compensation
paid.59
The initial version of Assembly Bill 678 denied disgorgement “if
the person knew that the contractor was unlicensed prior to making
any payments to the contractor.”60 The Senate removed this provision
from the final bill.61 This meant subdivision (a) remained a complete
defense and placed the risk of bad faith “squarely on the unlicensed
contractor’s shoulders.”62 Contractors found themselves subject to

57. Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 284 (Ct. App. 2010)
(emphasis omitted).
58. Act of Sept. 4, 2001, ch. 226, § 1, 2001 Cal. Stat. 2094, 2095.
59. ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 678, 2001–2002 Reg. Sess., at
2 (Cal. 2001) (as amended July 3, 2001).
60. Id. at 1.
61. See id. at 3.
62. Hydrotech Sys. Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370, 376 (Cal. 1991).

(10) 54.2_REED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

568

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/23/21 9:52 AM

[Vol. 54:555

disgorgement even if “induced to enter and perform an illegal contract
by a false promise to pay.”63
III. THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN CASE LAW—1993 TO PRESENT
Section 7031’s substantial compliance provision—originally
codified at subdivision (d), and now at (e)—has evolved but remains
largely intact since its 1993 enactment.64 The subsequent decades
produced dozens of published opinions in the high court and all
appellate districts analyzing the doctrine’s tortuous evolution and
applying the statute’s multi-part test in diverse factual and legal
contexts.65 The statute and its annotations, however, devote little
attention to how or when the trial court and litigants should actually
conduct evidentiary hearings under the statute.
Only a minority of published opinions describe the lower court
conducting a stand-alone, pre-trial hearing dedicated to taking
evidence about a contractor’s substantial compliance.66 The most
common practice is using summary adjudication or summary
judgment procedures in lieu of, or as a proxy for, a subdivision (e)

63. Id.
64. See S. COMM. ON BUS., PROS. & ECON. DEV., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1793, 2015–2016 Reg.
Sess., at 1–2, 4 (Cal. 2016). A minor revision to subdivision (e)’s multi-part substantial compliance
test in 2016 eliminated element 3 of (e), i.e., that the contractor “did not know or reasonably should
not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act commenced.” Id.
at 4. The change “clarifie[d] existing law to ensure that properly licensed and law abiding
construction firms are not placed at fatal monetary risk, by limiting the recovery time and
disgorgement amount to monies paid to the contractor for work performed while the contractor was
not properly licensed.” Id. at 6.
65. See, e.g., MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., 115 P.3d
41 (Cal. 2005); Womack v. Lovell, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Ct. App. 2015); Alatriste v. Cesar’s
Exterior Designs, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277 (Ct. App. 2010); White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr.
3d 434 (Ct. App. 2009); WSS Indus. Constr., Inc. v. Great W. Contractors, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 8
(Ct. App. 2008); Smith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Ct. App. 2002);
Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Ct. App. 1997); Vallejo Dev. Co. v. Beck
Dev. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Ct. App. 1994).
66. See Constr. Fin., LLC v. Perlite Plastering Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Ct. App. 1997) (threeday evidentiary hearing followed by statement of decision); see also Cooper Crane & Rigging Inc.
v. Pavex-Myers Joint Venture, No. C077272, 2017 WL 656762, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2017)
(trial court determined at pre-trial evidentiary hearing that subcontractor substantially complied
with the CSLL and could pursue claims against the general contractor).
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hearing.67 At least one opinion describes the trial court deciding the
issue during the first phase of a bifurcated trial.68
A pair of Second District Court of Appeal opinions show how
abruptly the need for a subdivision (e) hearing might arise even in the
advanced stages of litigation.69 The defendant in WSS Industrial
Construction, Inc. v. Great West Contractors, Inc.70 moved for nonsuit
at the close of plaintiff’s case because plaintiff’s own evidence showed
it did not possess a contractor’s license when work began.71 This
compelled the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing mid-trial to
determine whether defendant’s case would proceed.72 The defendant
in ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc. v. Superior Court73 did not invoke
subdivision (e) until after plaintiff obtained $800,000 in damages at
arbitration and petitioned to affirm the award.74 The trial court took
the petition off calendar and re-opened evidence on plaintiff’s
licensing problems.75 It ruled on the issue of substantial compliance
after considering—and granting—defendant’s subsequent petition to
vacate the award.76
The First District Court of Appeal’s Judicial Council of
California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc.77 is the only decision to explore
the procedural parameters of a subdivision (e) hearing in earnest.78
Defendant Jacobs provided maintenance services at plaintiff Judicial
Council’s office building.79 Judicial Council sued for disgorgement
after Jacobs allowed its license to lapse following a corporate
67. See, e.g., MW Erectors, Inc., 115 P.3d at 41 (lack of substantial compliance determined
on summary adjudication; affirmed in part, reversed in part); Alatriste, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 277
(lack of substantial compliance determined on summary adjudication; affirmed); Opp v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 260 (Ct. App. 2007) (lack of substantial compliance
determined on summary judgment; affirmed); Pac. Custom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 94
Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Ct. App. 2000) (lack of substantial compliance determined on summary
judgment; affirmed in part).
68. See Zinchik v. Moore, No. A129548, 2011 WL 5128180, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26,
2011).
69. See WSS Indus. Constr., Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 8; ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc. v. Superior
Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 (Ct. App. 1999).
70. 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 8 (Ct. App. 2008).
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id.
73. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 (Ct. App. 1999).
74. Id. at 89–90.
75. Id. at 90.
76. Id. at 89.
77. 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714 (Ct. App. 2015).
78. Id. at 738–41.
79. Id. at 719.
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restructuring.80 Jacobs requested a substantial compliance hearing, but
the court decided to proceed with a jury trial first.81 The jury found in
favor of Jacobs, which rendered Jacobs’ substantial compliance
defense moot.82
The court of appeal reversed and instructed the trial court to
conduct “a full evidentiary hearing on the issues relevant to the
elements of substantial compliance under subdivision (e).”83 It
described the jury’s verdict in Jacobs’ favor “as an attempt to reach an
equitable resolution, given the harsh consequences to defendants from
the strict application of section 7031.”84 The substantial compliance
doctrine, though now codified in a “restricted” form, remained an
equitable issue for the court to decide rather than a legal issue for the
jury.85
The court rejected Judicial Council’s argument that Jacobs
forfeited the right to a hearing by not renewing its request after trial.86
It held Jacobs preserved this right by: (1) raising substantial
compliance as an affirmative defense in its answer to the complaint;
and (2) requesting the hearing before trial.87 It instructed the trial court
to impose section 7031 penalties on remand only if it determined
Jacobs failed to satisfy subdivision (e)’s factors.88
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LITIGANTS AND JUDICIAL
OFFICERS CONFRONTING CONTRACTOR LICENSING ISSUES
Codifying judicial substantial compliance factors tethered many
of the doctrine’s original tenets to the CSLL’s policy aims. This
legislative compromise eased the tension created by a law that
expected judges to ignore their equitable instincts when enforcing an
unduly punitive statute. Adding a disgorgement cause of action to
80. Id. at 721.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 718.
83. Id. at 738.
84. Id. at 737.
85. Id. at 728; see id. at 739 (“Reflecting trial courts’ similar understanding of this language,
the statutory substantial compliance determinations reviewed in reported appellate decisions have
been made by judges, rather than juries.”); see also id. at 741 (“Alternatively, as asserted by
defendants in response to JCC’s claim for disgorgement, substantial compliance is an equitable
defense to JCC’s claim. Either way, the doctrine is equitable in nature. Accordingly, defendants
have no constitutional right to its determination by a jury.”).
86. Id. at 738.
87. Id. at 737–38.
88. Id. at 738, 741.
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section 7031, however, transformed a historically defensive statute
into an effective weapon for consumers. Counsel on both sides of the
aisle in a construction dispute should survey the landscape for CSLL
violations as their first order of business. As discussed above, neither
subdivision (e)’s text nor case law gives contractors, consumers, or
judicial officers procedural guidance if such violations come into play.
This Part of the Article identifies the unique issues and opportunities
the statute creates for each of these three groups.
A. Counsel for Contractors
Counsel for contractors should advise their clients to delay or
even forego collection actions on projects performed during periods
when CSLL violations occurred—especially if the contractor
collected significant amounts from the consumer. Initiating a lawsuit
will invite a disgorgement cross-claim that could exceed the amount
owed. The contractor should proceed only if confident that he or she
can satisfy each of subdivision (e)’s substantial compliance factors at
an evidentiary hearing.89
1. Evaluating the Contractor’s Substantial Compliance Defense
Questions such as these will help counsel determine whether the
client accused of violating the CSLL is likely to prevail under
subdivision (e):
• Does the contractor’s certified license history reflect
a suspension or revocation?
• If yes, did the suspension or revocation occur while
the contractor was working on the project in dispute?
• Did any of the contractor’s officers or employees
know about the suspension or revocation?
• If yes, when did the officer or employee first discover
the suspension or revocation?

89. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e) (Deering 2020). Subdivision (e) states as follows
at the time of writing: “[T]he court may determine that there has been substantial compliance with
licensure requirements under this section if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person
who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1) had been duly licensed as
a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and in
good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) acted promptly and in good faith to remedy the
failure to comply with the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure.” Id.
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•

Did the Board send a written notice of suspension or
revocation? What other communications and
documents show what happened?
• Did the contractor contact the Board to discuss the
issue? By phone? Email?
• What steps did the contractor take to fix the issue?
• Which of the contractor’s officers or employees were
responsible for maintaining the entity’s license?
• Has any consumer filed a complaint with the Board
in the past five years?
• If yes, did that complaint result in Board discipline for the
contractor?
The last two questions raise particularly important concerns. Civil
cases between a contractor and consumer often run parallel with Board
disciplinary proceedings arising from the same dispute. This usually
occurs when the consumer files a complaint against the contractor with
the Board before or during litigation. The Board may refer the
complaint to the Attorney General for accusation—i.e., formal
administrative proceedings—after investigating the complaint.90
Contracting with a suspended license is cause for Board discipline on
top of any civil or criminal penalties the contractor could face for those
violations.91 The findings of the administrative tribunal may have
collateral estoppel effects which, for better or worse, may influence
the trial court’s substantial compliance determination.92 For this
reason, counsel should advise contractor clients to defer collection
actions until they resolve pending Board complaints or accusation
proceedings.93

90. See Id. §§ 7090–7124.6.
91. See id. § 7114.2 (“Any licensed or unlicensed person who commits any act prohibited by
Section 119 is subject to the administrative remedies authorized by this chapter. Unless otherwise
expressly provided, the remedies authorized under this section shall be separate from, and in
addition to, all other available remedies, whether civil or criminal.”); see also id. § 7117.5(b)
(contracting with a suspended license constitutes cause for discipline).
92. See Pac. Lumber Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 126 P.3d 1040, 1054–55 (Cal. 2006)
(findings of an administrative agency may have collateral estoppel effect if the proceedings were
of a “judicial character”); People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1982) (holding that welfare hearing
was “judicial” in nature; parties permitted to subpoena, examine and cross-examine witnesses under
oath, and present oral and written argument; hearing officer issued written ruling that applied law
to the facts of the case).
93. California’s four-year limitations period for breach of written contract under Code of Civil
Procedure section 337 should accommodate such proceedings under most circumstances.
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2. Identifying Potential CSLL Violations That May Lead to
Suspension of a Contractor’s License as a Matter of Law
A contractor is not out of the woods because his or her license
history does not reflect a suspension or revocation. Courts may
suspend a contractor’s license as a matter of law if the evidence shows
a contractor violated the CSLL. This happens most commonly in two
situations. The first is when an owner-contractor is caught evading
workers’ compensation requirements by falsely claiming he or she has
no employees.94 The second is when a contractor does not notify the
Board of an unpaid money judgment within ninety days.95 A similar
problem could occur if the client’s $15,000 contractor’s bond is not
renewed.96 Therefore, counsel should confirm the contractor
consistently maintained its bond and workers’ compensation coverage
over the relevant period, or, if claiming exemption on the latter, that
the contractor completed the project without employees or workers
paid “under the table.” Counsel should also ask whether the client was
a party to any legal proceedings in the preceding four or five years,
and if so, confirm no reportable judgments exist.
3. Representing the Contractor Sued by a Consumer Alleging CSLL
Violations
A contractor cannot delay or forego litigation when the consumer
sues first. If the complaint alleges a licensing violation, the contractor
must raise substantial compliance as an affirmative defense in its
94. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7125.2 (“The failure of a licensee to obtain or maintain
workers’ compensation insurance coverage, if required under this chapter, shall result in the
automatic suspension of the license by operation of law in accordance with the provisions of this
section . . . .”); see Wright v. Issak, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding a contractor’s
license suspended by operation of law when he systematically underreported payroll to avoid
purchasing workers’ compensation insurance).
95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7071.17 (“[T]he board shall require . . . that an applicant,
previously found to have failed or refused to pay a contractor, subcontractor, consumer, materials
supplier, or employee based on an unsatisfied final judgment, file or have on file with the board a
bond sufficient to guarantee payment of an amount equal to the unsatisfied final judgment or
judgments. The applicant shall have 90 days from the date of notification by the board to file the
bond or the application shall become void.”); see Pac. Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros.
Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 337 (Ct. App. 2015) (affirming a finding that contractor did not substantially
comply with CSLL when the Board suspended its license for failing to notify the Board of unpaid
judgment).
96. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7071.6(a) (“The board shall require as a condition precedent
to the issuance, reinstatement, reactivation, renewal, or continued maintenance of a license, that the
applicant or licensee file or have on file a contractor’s bond in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars
($15,000).”).
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answer to avoid waiver.97 While Jacobs Facilities held the contractor
could request a subdivision (e) as late as trial call, counsel should
consider broaching the topic during the initial case management
conference.98 This will enable the parties and court to discuss whether
to resolve the issue of substantial compliance before starting
construction defect discovery or other resource intensive activities.
Counsel can also discern whether the assigned judge is familiar with
the CSLL, and to ask whether he or she would accept supplemental
briefing on the subject or a proposed case management order
describing how the matter should proceed.
4. Representing the Contractor That Insists on Suing a Consumer
Despite CSLL Violations
The contractor client with license issues may nevertheless elect
to proceed with collection despite the risk of dismissal or a retaliatory
cross-claim for disgorgement. The priority in these circumstances is
to properly plead the contractor’s claim while preserving the
substantial compliance defense in the event of a section 7031
challenge.
The initial hurdle is the requirement that a contractor allege he or
she “was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance
of that act or contract” for which he or she seeks payment.99 Failing to
do so exposes the contractor’s complaint to demurrer.100 Case law
does not address how a contractor with a past suspension or
revocation, but who believes he or she substantially complied with the
CSLL, can truthfully allege to have been “duly licensed” at all
times.101 Pleading as follows may satisfy both the pleading
requirement and the contractor’s duty of candor to the court:
The Contractors State License Board issued plaintiff general
building contractor license number 991850 on September 9,
2015. Plaintiff’s license remained active at all times relevant
to this action except that period of suspension between
November 13, 2019 and December 1, 2019. Plaintiff alleges
97. See Jud. Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 737–38 (Ct. App.
2015).
98. See id.
99. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(a).
100. See Fraenkel v. Trescony, 309 P.2d 819, 823 (Cal. 1957) (“[P]laintiff, as an unlicensed
contractor, was properly held to be precluded from maintaining the present action.”).
101. Id. at 824 (Schauer, J., dissenting).
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it substantially complied with licensure requirements under
Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (e)
despite this period of suspension, and hereby requests an
evidentiary hearing on that issue prior to entry of judgment.
A more succinct allegation like the following may also enable the
contractor to survive a pleading challenge:
“Plaintiff alleges it substantially complied with contractor
licensure requirements under Business and Professions Code section
7031, subdivision (e), and hereby requests an evidentiary hearing on
that issue prior to entry of judgment.”
In summary, counsel should explain to contractor clients how
severely the CSLL punishes licensing gaps. The briefest suspension
may prove fatal if the contractor cannot piece together a credible
factual narrative that satisfies subdivision (e)’s three-factor test.
Counsel should encourage the contractor to divulge all
communications and documents relating to the mistake or oversight to
counsel. In addition, counsel should advise leadership not to blame or
discipline employees whose conduct precipitated the suspension—a
mail clerk who misfiled a money judgment, for example—but rather
instruct them to cooperate with counsel’s investigation to fix the
mistake. A loyal and penitent employee’s testimony can serve as the
centerpiece of the contractor’s substantial compliance defense.
B. Counsel for Consumers
Section 7031 remains a powerful weapon for consumers. A
consumer facing a contractor’s collection lawsuit quickly gains the
upper hand if he or she can cast a shadow over the contractor’s license
status. The statute provides one of the few opportunities under
California law for a litigant to prevail regardless of the strength of their
opponent’s claims and defenses, or the weakness of their own.
1. Finding a Violation
Counsel for the consumer should check a contractor’s license
status as soon as a dispute arises. The Board’s online “Check a
License” database provides immediate access to basic data about all
licenses issued since the 1940s.102 This includes a contractor’s current
102. Check a Contractor License or Home Improvement Salesperson (HIS) Registration,
CA.GOV, https://www.cslb.ca.gov/onlineservices/checklicenseII/checklicense.aspx (last visited
Nov. 22, 2020).
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license status, pending and past discipline, bond information, and the
contractor’s workers’ compensation insurance or claim of
exemption.103 Counsel should also request a certified license
history.104 This will indicate whether the Board revoked or suspended
a license in the past and whether the contractor maintained the required
insurance and bond throughout its existence. 105 If counsel discovers
an anomaly—particularly a suspension or revocation during the time
the contractor worked for the consumer—counsel should contact the
Board’s consumer hotline to confirm whether the information
provided in these public resources is correct.
2. Violations Appearing on a Contractor’s License Record
The degree to which a consumer can leverage his or her
contractor’s CSLL violation depends on the violation’s timing and
severity. Most vulnerable to attack is a contractor that began working
on a project without an active license. This often occurs when a
contractor accepts work while waiting for the Board to process his or
her initial application and expecting to receive a license midproject.106 If sued, the contractor cannot establish the first substantial
compliance factor, i.e., that it was licensed “prior to the performance
of the act or contract.”107 Likewise, the contractor cannot maintain a
cross-claim against the consumer because he or she cannot allege he
or she “was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the
performance.”108 Defending the action or pursuing a collection claim
103. Id.
104. See Form, Request for Certified License History, Contractors State License Bd., State of
Cal. (last revised Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.cslb.ca.gov/Resources/FormsAndApplications/Req
uestForCertifiedLicenseHistoryVerifiedCertificate.pdf.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Twenty-Nine Palms Enters. Corp. v. Bardos, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52 (Ct. App.
2012) (finding the owner of a contracting entity did not substantially comply with CSLL because
he did not apply for license when contract was signed and work commenced).
107. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e) (Deering 2020) (“[T]he court may determine that
there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements under this section if it is shown
at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a
contractor (1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the
act or contract.” (emphasis added)). But see Brown v. Solano Cnty. Bus. Dev., Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr.
700 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding a contractor satisfied first substantial compliance factor even though
license lapsed shortly after he began performing contract; pre-statute case); Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado
Ice Palace, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1973) (finding a contractor who received his license
after signing contract, but before starting work, could demonstrate substantial compliance; prestatute case).
108. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(a).
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is futile. Counsel for the consumer can negotiate a prompt and
favorable settlement under these circumstances. If the contractor plods
ahead regardless, the consumer can file a demurrer to the complaint
and request judicial notice of the contractor’s license history.109
Counsel should also consider filing a preemptive request for
evidentiary hearing concurrently with the demurrer. This will place
the contractor on notice of subdivision (e) and provide an opportunity
to gather evidence about its license, thereby foreclosing an appeal on
the grounds the court did not provide an evidentiary hearing before
entering judgment of dismissal.110
3. Mid-Project Suspensions and Violations Not Appearing on a
Contractor’s License Record
A consumer’s section 7031 challenge is more complicated if the
contractor loses its license mid-project or if the consumer bases its
challenge on a CSLL violation that does not appear on the contractor’s
license record. As discussed earlier, a contractor can plead around
mid-project license gaps in its complaint or answer by alleging
substantial compliance. A consumer seeking to revoke the contractor’s
license as a matter of law—by proving the contractor falsely claimed
exemption from workers’ compensation requirements, for example—
will need to shepherd evidence supporting this theory.111 Such factintensive inquiries are often resolved by summary adjudication and
summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure 437c.112 This is a
lengthy and expensive process. A party can file its motion no sooner
than sixty days after the opposing party appears in the action.113 The
109. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.30(a) (“When any ground for objection to a complaint,
cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is
required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer
to the pleading.” (emphasis added)).
110. See Jud. Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 737–38 (Ct. App.
2015) (finding a contractor entitled to full evidentiary hearing prior to entry of judgment on
disgorgement claim).
111. See Wright v. Issak, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2007); Zinchik v. Moore, No. A129548,
2011 WL 5128180, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011). But see Loranger v. Jones, 109 Cal. Rptr.
3d 120 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to suspend contractor’s license by operation of law where
homeowners alleged their contractor used unreported employees on job site and sought
disgorgement under Business and Professions Code sections 7125.2 and 7031 subdivision (b)
because contractor possessed workers’ compensation; showing discrepancies in contractor’s
payroll reports to workers’ compensation insurer did not constitute a failure to obtain insurance
under section 7125.2).
112. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a).
113. Id.
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consumer would need to provide the contractor at least seventy-five
days’ notice and prepare a notice of motion, a motion, points and
authorities, separate statement, supporting declarations, compendium
of exhibits, and any request(s) for judicial notice.114
A substantial compliance evidentiary hearing can serve as a more
efficient alternative. Nothing in subdivision (e) prevents the consumer
rather than the contractor from initiating the evidentiary hearing
process and pursuing pre-trial relief under section 7031 before
litigating other issues. Resolving license-related issues earlier serves
the consumer’s interests, especially if the consumer has a meritorious
CSLL claim, but cannot front the fees and costs associated with a
traditional dispositive motion. The contractor’s due process rights are
likewise protected because he or she is afforded the “full evidentiary
hearing” contemplated by Jacobs Facilities.115
C. Judicial Officers
Section 7031’s legislative history and annotations encourage
courts to view subdivision (e)’s “evidentiary hearing” as a concept
rather than a rigid procedural mandate.116 The hearing represents the
need to guard contractors’ due process rights when the CSLL affords
consumers every advantage. The dearth of procedural guidance allows
judicial officers to confront licensing issues in a manner best suited to
the circumstances. The challenge faced today is the same faced by
Chief Justice Gibson’s court in Gatti and Chief Justice Tobriner’s
court in Latipac—how to discern which violations deserve the CSLL’s
severe penalties and which deserve leniency.117 The legislature’s 1993
amendments to section 7031 tacitly acknowledged California’s courts
are better suited to make these nuanced determinations.
1. Preliminary Considerations When Confronted with Contractor
Licensing Issues
When a litigant raises an opponent’s potential licensing violation,
the court should first determine if the issue might resolve the case in
whole or in part. A half-day subdivision (e) hearing conducted

114. Id. § 437c(a)–(b); see also Cal. R. Ct. R. 3.1350.
115. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 737–38.
116. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e) (Deering 2020).
117. Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 166 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1946); Latipac, Inc. v. Superior
Ct., 411 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1966).
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concurrently with a demurrer hearing, for example, may suffice if the
contractor’s license history reflects a brief suspension caused by a
simple office error. Eliciting the testimony of a handful of witnesses
might produce an evidentiary record sufficient to rule fairly. An early
finding of substantial compliance with the CSLL would permit the
parties to move forward on the case’s remaining claims and defenses
without wondering if a subsequent ruling will render those matters
moot. Conversely, finding the contractor did not comply could narrow
the case by jettisoning the contractor’s claims or even dispose of the
case entirely. As discussed above, the initial case management
conference provides an opportunity for the court and litigants to
discuss how alleged CSLL violations may impact the case and whether
a subdivision (e) hearing is needed.
2. Discovery Relating to Substantial Compliance
Less clear-cut CSLL violations may require the parties to conduct
discovery before jumping into an evidentiary hearing. The court
should limit the subject matter of such discovery to evidence relevant
to (1) the alleged violation or violations; (2) how the violation or
violations affected the contractor’s license, e.g., a suspension between
dates X and date Y; and (3) whether the contractor satisfied subdivision
(e)’s three-factor test. The court should specify in its case management
order or stipulated discovery order that such restrictions do not reduce
the number of written discovery requests available to the parties under
the Discovery Act or prevent them from re-deposing witnesses who
testified about the issues above.118 The order should schedule a status
conference at which the parties can discuss the progress of CSLL
discovery, identify the key factual issues the court must resolve,
estimate how much time the parties will need to present their evidence,
and agree on the date for the subdivision (e) hearing.
3. The Subdivision (e) Hearing as an Alternative to Summary
Judgment or Adjudication
As discussed above, section 7031’s annotations show courts
frequently use summary judgment or adjudication to decide
118. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 2025.290(a) (setting seven-hour maximum for oral deposition
of a witness); Id. § 2030.030 (limiting parties to thirty-five specially prepared interrogatories in
unlimited civil matters); id. § 2033.030(a) (limiting parties to thirty-five requests for admission
relating to “matters that do not relate to the genuineness of documents”).
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substantial compliance. Inertia may explain this fact. Courts and
litigants seem to assume they must fire up the cumbersome but
familiar machinery of section 437c if they want to resolve a claim or
defense before trial.119 However, subdivision (e)’s use of the phrase
“shown at an evidentiary hearing” rather than “shown at trial”
indicates the legislature did not contemplate dispositive motions or
trial as the exclusive means of adjudicating substantial compliance.120
The statute’s laconic text invites judicial officers to shed the Code of
Civil Procedure’s rigid conventions and to handle the issue like a
chancellor in equity.
Further, two provisions of section 437c appear to conflict with
section 7031. First, section 437c requires the parties to submit all
supporting evidence in advance of hearing, whereas subdivision (e)
provides for the parties to present evidence at hearing.121 The parties
moving and opposing summary judgment or adjudication must submit
evidence by way of affidavit or judicial notice and cannot use live
testimony “unless the court orders otherwise for good cause
shown.”122 In contrast, subdivision (e) does not mention pre-hearing
filings or even the need to proceed by noticed motion under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1005. Second, different burdens apply under
each statute. Section 437c places the initial burden of proof on the
movant, whether plaintiff or defendant, and shifts the burden only after
the movant has proven a lack of triable issue of material fact as to the
subject claim or defense.123 Section 7031 requires the contractor—
never the consumer—to prove licensure whenever the issue is
controverted.124 As such, the court should clarify each side’s burdens
in advance if the parties decide to proceed by dispositive motion under

119. See Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493 (Cal. 2001) (“The purpose of [§ 437c] . . .
is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”).
120. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e).
121. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a)–(b), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e).
122. Cal. R. Ct. R. 3.1306(a).
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(p).
124. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (“Nothing in this subdivision shall require any person
or entity controverting licensure or proper licensure to produce a verified certificate. When
licensure or proper licensure is controverted, the burden of proof to establish licensure or proper
licensure shall be on the licensee.”); see Womack v. Lovell, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 480 (Ct. App.
2015) (“Assembly Bill No. 628 . . . clarified that contractors still had the burden of proving
licensure and there was no need for persons they were suing for compensation to produce the
verified certificate.” (emphasis omitted)).
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section 437c in lieu of, or in addition to, exhibits and testimony at a
separate substantial compliance hearing.
4. Evidentiary Hearings and Disgorgement Awards
One area not yet explored by case law is how section 7031
subdivision (b)’s disgorgement remedy dovetails with subdivision
(e)’s hearing requirement. Finding a contractor substantially complied
with the CSLL despite a license lapse would presumably dispose of a
consumer’s disgorgement claim entirely. The opposite finding would
confirm the defendant’s status as an “unlicensed contractor” under
subdivision (b) and would entitle the consumer to disgorgement as a
matter of law, with only the amount of disgorgement left for the court
to determine.125 Jacobs Facilities did not suggest any further
proceedings were required to impose section 7031’s penalties once the
contractor obtained the requested hearing.126 Compelling the
consumer to take the additional step of moving for summary
adjudication or proceeding to trial on its disgorgement claim seems
needless, and further, could easily cost the consumer more than the
award itself—especially because section 7031 does not provide for an
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party.127
The court should consider taking evidence at the hearing about
the amounts the consumer paid to the contractor and the timing of
those payments. This will enable the court to calculate a disgorgement
award if the contractor fails to show substantial compliance.128
5. Hearings During or After Trial
Resolving substantial compliance in advance of trial is not always
necessary or better, especially when the contractor does not seek to
collect from the consumer. The evidence presented by the parties in a
consumer’s action for construction defect or fraud, for example, may
overlap in significant part with evidence related to substantial
compliance. The parties may prefer not to spend time and money on
an evidentiary hearing when the monetary damages sought by the
125. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(b).
126. Jud. Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 741 (Ct. App. 2015)
(instructing trial court to enter judgment for disgorgement figure sought by plaintiff if defendant
did not demonstrate statutory substantial compliance after hearing on remand).
127. Id. (“Unless the prevailing party can demonstrate a valid basis for an award of attorney
fees other than those already asserted by the Jacobs entities, it shall not be awarded attorney fees.”).
128. See discussion infra Part V regarding the calculation of disgorgement.
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consumer greatly exceed the potential subdivision (b) claim or might
be swallowed by offset. In those circumstances, the court may
consider bifurcating trial so evidence relevant only to substantial
compliance—a purely equitable issue—is heard before or after the
jury trial, or outside the presence of jurors altogether.129 The court
could then rule on the disgorgement claim or take the matter under
submission at the close of evidence.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
Subdivision (e)’s evidentiary hearing embodies a compromise
between the legislature’s police powers and the judiciary’s equitable
powers. While section 7031 served one master during its first five
decades—the consumer—the legislature’s 1992 amendments
repurposed the statute as a mechanism the courts can use to balance
the interests of both consumers and contractors. The legislature’s
frequent amendments since that time reveal the delicacy of this
balance. One proposing yet more changes to the law must take care
not to tip the scales with well-intended “improvements.” Subdivision
(e)’s austere text and procedural flexibility may be one of its greatest
strengths. That said, the following three issues deserve the
legislature’s attention should it consider amending the statute.
First, section 7031 should address how a substantial compliance
determination under subdivision (e) impacts a case in which the
consumer seeks disgorgement under subdivision (b). The original
statute provided the consumer with a purely defensive remedy, i.e., a
pleading challenge that robbed the plaintiff contractor of its standing
to sue the consumer. The doctrine and its statutory successor
developed in response to this defensive remedy. When the legislature
added a disgorgement remedy in subdivision (b) it neglected to
synthesize the provision with subdivision (e). The court’s ruling at a
subdivision (e) hearing may not end the matter but in fact raise new
129. Jacobs Facilities dedicated a significant part of its analysis to the equitable nature of
substantial compliance and the court’s obligation to resolve the issue separately from the parties’
legal claims if tried together. See Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 740 (“Whichever
approach is adopted, equitable issues retain their character, despite being raised in the context of a
legal claim. A litigant has no constitutional right to a jury determination of an equitable issue merely
because it is raised in the context of a claim at law.”). This distinction is not always easy to discern.
See Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 438 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a jury
decision whether contractor used a “sham” responsible managing employee as qualifying
individual impacted contractor’s license status and substantial compliance with CSLL).

(10) 54.2_REED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/23/21 9:52 AM

BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 7031

583

questions. For example, should the court dismiss the consumer’s
disgorgement claim immediately if it finds the contractor substantially
complied? Should it enter a directed verdict for the consumer if it finds
the contractor did not, then immediately proceed to take evidence on
the correct amount of disgorgement?
Second, in the event the legislature blends or coordinates
subdivisions (b) and (e) to allow for a summary disgorgement
procedure, it should clarify the degree of discretion the court may
exercise when deciding the amount a contractor must disgorge if he or
she cannot show substantial compliance. This issue comes to the fore
when the case involves a mid-project lapse. The current subdivision
(b) allows the consumer to “recover all compensation paid to the
unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.”130 On
one hand, the court could interpret this as requiring a contractor with
a brief license lapse to disgorge all amounts received over the course
of the entire project. On the other hand, the court could interpret this
as requiring a contractor to disgorge only those amounts paid during
the lapse.
Third, section 7031 appears to relieve the consumer of their
burden to prove its right to disgorgement by requiring the contractor
to disprove the consumer’s licensing allegations. Failing to do so leads
to a near-certain disgorgement judgment. The statute should clarify
the consumer’s obligation to establish the appropriate amount of
disgorgement in the event the contractor cannot demonstrate
substantial compliance under subdivision (e).
The following proposed amendments to subdivisions (b), (d), and
(e) may enable these provisions to work better in concert:
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (e), a person who
utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to
recover all that portion of compensation paid to the
unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract
while unlicensed.
...
(d) If licensure or proper licensure is controverted, then proof
of licensure pursuant to this section shall be made by
production of a verified certificate of licensure from the
130. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(b).
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Contractors’ State License Board which establishes that the
individual or entity bringing the action was duly licensed in
the proper classification of contractors at all times during the
performance of any act or contract covered by the action.
Nothing in this subdivision shall require any person or entity
controverting licensure or proper licensure to produce a
verified certificate. When licensure or proper licensure is
controverted, the burden of proof to establish licensure or
proper licensure shall be on the licensee. Any person seeking
to recover compensation under subdivision (e) shall have the
burden of proof to establish the appropriate amount of
compensation paid to the contractor while unlicensed.
...
(e) The judicial doctrine of substantial compliance shall not
apply under this section where the person who engaged in the
business or acted in the capacity of a contractor has never
been a duly licensed contractor in this state. However,
notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 143, the court
may determine that there has been substantial compliance
with licensure requirements under this section if it is shown
at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in the
business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1) had been
duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the
performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and
in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) acted
promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to comply
with the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure.
The court may, in its discretion, adjudicate the contractor’s
liability for disgorgement under subdivision (b) concurrently
with the issue of the contractor’s substantial compliance
under this subdivision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Codifying the judicial substantial compliance doctrine eased a
decades-long tug-of-war between California’s legislative and judicial
branches. Permitting courts to exercise their equitable discretion
within a well-defined legal framework enables California to maintain
a hard line against unlicensed contracting without punishing those
whose licensing problems resulted from good faith errors. The
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evidentiary hearing under subdivision (e) allows litigants and judicial
officers to blend law and equity, and in doing so, to resolve contractor
licensing issues promptly and efficiently. The handful of minor
revisions proposed here would clarify the statute’s ambiguities and
allow the current line of authorities to evolve rather than break.
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